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Abstract
Co-speech gestures have been proposed to strengthen sensorimotor knowledge related to objects’ weight and manipulability. 
This pre-registered study (https ://www.osf.io/9uh6q /) was designed to explore how gestures affect memory for sensorimotor 
information through the application of the visual-haptic size-weight illusion (i.e., objects weigh the same, but are experi-
enced as different in weight). With this paradigm, a discrepancy can be induced between participants’ conscious illusory 
perception of objects’ weight and their implicit sensorimotor knowledge (i.e., veridical motor coordination). Depending on 
whether gestures reflect and strengthen either of these types of knowledge, gestures may respectively decrease or increase 
the magnitude of the size-weight illusion. Participants (N = 159) practiced a problem-solving task with small and large 
objects that were designed to induce a size-weight illusion, and then explained the task with or without co-speech gesture 
or completed a control task. Afterwards, participants judged the heaviness of objects from memory and then while holding 
them. Confirmatory analyses revealed an inverted size-weight illusion based on heaviness judgments from memory and we 
found gesturing did not affect judgments. However, exploratory analyses showed reliable correlations between participants’ 
heaviness judgments from memory and (a) the number of gestures produced that simulated actions, and (b) the kinematics of 
the lifting phases of those gestures. These findings suggest that gestures emerge as sensorimotor imaginings that are governed 
by the agent’s conscious renderings about the actions they describe, rather than implicit motor routines.
Introduction
Sensorimotor knowledge from the previous interactions with 
the environment plays an important role in planning and 
predicting everyday actions. For example, imagining object 
rotations is aided by hand gestures that simulate the manipu-
lation of those objects (Chu & Kita, 2011; see also Alibali, 
Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011; Boncoddo, Dixon, & Kelly, 
2010). It has been suggested that, by recruiting sensorimotor 
routines, remembered information of the previous interac-
tions with objects becomes available that can support the 
predictability of the environment (Hostetter & Boncoddo, 
2017; Pouw & Hostetter, 2016). Relevant to the present 
study, it has been found that gestures can also strengthen 
sensorimotor information in memory, which makes the 
information about object manipulation more prominent, and 
affects subsequent action on objects (e.g., Goldin-Meadow 
& Beilock, 2010). In the current study, we test this sen-
sorimotor strengthening effect by exploring how co-speech 
hand gestures affect memory for sensorimotor information 
through the application of a well-known visual-haptic illu-
sion known as the size-weight illusion.
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The size-weight illusion (SWI) occurs when participants 
perceive a difference in the heaviness when lifting two dif-
ferently sized objects that are, in fact, the same weight (i.e., 
haptic perception; for a review, see Buckingham, 2014). 
Specifically, a smaller object is experienced to be heavier 
than a larger object with the same weight. The exact mecha-
nisms of the SWI are still under debate and may relate to 
the veridical perception of wieldability of an object (e.g., 
Amazeen & Turvey, 1996; Zhu & Bingham, 2011) and/or 
top–down expectations that small objects should be lighter 
than larger objects leading to expectation errors that bias 
experience (see Buckingham, 2014). The SWI is so robust 
that it persists even when participants have been told that the 
objects are the same weight and have been allowed to lift the 
objects with their eyes closed and feel the equivalent weight 
(Buckingham, 2014). The SWI is also present on the motor 
level, as it initially affects the gripping strength participants 
use to lift objects (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000).
However, despite the persistence of the consciously expe-
rienced illusion, participants’ motor coordination eventually 
attunes to the lack of difference in weights after interact-
ing with the objects multiple times. After lifting the objects 
20 times, participants no longer overestimate the strength 
needed to lift a smaller object relative to a larger object (Fla-
nagan & Beltzner, 2000). It appears that the perceptuo-motor 
system comes to attune to the veridical sensory feedback 
from lifting the objects, even while the conscious experi-
ence that the smaller object is heavier than the larger object 
remains unaltered. Therefore, after repeatedly (> 20 times) 
lifting the objects, there seems to be a disconnect in the 
sensorimotor knowledge available to the motor system as it 
plans a hand-grasp and the sensorimotor knowledge that is 
consciously available to the participant. This disassociation 
between implicit motor knowledge and explicit conscious 
knowledge has been explained by the different functional 
roles of the dorsal and ventral neural pathways (see Goodale 
& Milner, 1992). Importantly, because implicit motor knowl-
edge and explicit knowledge diverge, the SWI is an inter-
esting phenomenon for understanding how gestures might 
strengthen different kinds of sensorimotor knowledge.
Gestures differ from real actions, because they do not 
involve objects, and they differ from pantomimes, because 
they accompany speech. There is some evidence suggest-
ing that gestures can affect how speakers think about the 
weight of the objects which they describe (Beilock & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Cooperrider, Wakefield, & Gol-
din-Meadow, 2015; Trofatter, Kontra, Beilock, & Goldin-
Meadow, 2015). Beilock and Goldin-Meadow (2010) had 
participants solve the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) task, in which 
participants manipulate discs of different sizes and corre-
sponding weights according to specific rules. After solving 
the task, some participants were asked to explain how they 
solved the task and to use gestures as they did so. Then, 
all participants were asked to solve the task a second time 
in one of two conditions. In the No Switch condition, the 
second task was physically identical to the previous task. 
In the Switch condition, the discs’ weights were switched, 
so that the smallest disc was now the heaviest and could no 
longer be lifted with one hand. Beilock and Goldin-Meadow 
(2010) showed that the more participants gestured about lift-
ing the smallest disc with one hand, the more impaired they 
were on the second version of the task when the weights had 
been switched. The basic effect has been replicated several 
times with similar methodological procedures and sample 
sizes (Cooperrider et al., 2015; Trofatter et al., 2015; but see 
Wassenburg, de Koning, & van der Schoot, 2018 for con-
trasting evidence), and the general explanation provided for 
it is that “using gesture to describe physical interactions with 
the environment generates strong mental representations that 
involve physical properties of the action and/or the environ-
ment (properties like weight)” (Trofatter et al., 2015, p. 8).
If this explanation is extended to gestures about objects 
that induce an SWI, participants’ memories for the weights 
of the objects should be affected by whether they gestured 
about lifting them. This could be manifest in either of two 
ways, depending on the nature of the sensorimotor knowl-
edge that gestures strengthen (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000). 
On one hand, gestures may bring the conscious perception 
of the objects’ weights more in line with the sensorimotor 
knowledge that is available to the motor system as partici-
pants actually lift the objects. For example, there is evidence 
that manual pantomimes (i.e., enactment of an interaction 
without a present object) approximate the kinematics of nor-
mal grasping actions to a high degree (Weiss, Jeannerod, 
Paulignan, & Freund, 2000) and that they simulate action-
specific knowledge such as weight (Ansuini et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, some evidence suggests that gestures can 
help problem solvers to gain conscious awareness of their 
implicit knowledge (e.g., Church & Goldin-Meadow, 1986; 
Perry, Church, & Goldin-Meadow, 1988). Under this view, 
gesturing about lifting the objects repeatedly may align par-
ticipants’ conscious perception of the weights of the objects 
more closely with the sensorimotor knowledge which they 
possess about how to actually lift them. This would result in 
a smaller SWI after gesturing about lifting the objects than 
after not gesturing.
On the other hand, it is also possible that gesturing about 
lifting the objects could strengthen the size of the illusion. 
Under this view, gesturing about lifting the objects could 
reflect and strengthen participants’ memory of the conscious 
perception that the smaller object is heavier, rather than 
their sensorimotor knowledge about how to actually lift the 
objects that are of the same weight. Pantomimes appear to be 
coordinated by a system concerned with perceptual aspects 
of objects rather than implicit action-specific (motor-rele-
vant) properties of objects (Goodale, Jakobson, & Keillor, 
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1994). For example, when participants are asked to pan-
tomime grasping a previously seen stick—that is designed 
to induce a visual illusion (i.e., Müller-Lyer illusion)—the 
hand aperture is biased by their illusory perception of the 
stick length. In contrast, when participants reach to grasp 
the actual sticks, the kinematics of their hand aperture do 
not reflect this illusory perception to similar degress and 
are, instead, more attuned to the actual lengths of the sticks 
(Westwood, Heath, & Roy, 2000). Thus, it is possible that 
gesturing about lifting the objects will further cement the 
illusory rendering that the smaller object is heavier in weight 
than the larger object.
In the present study, we test these possibilities by first 
having all participants practice solving a problem with 
pieces that induce a size-weight illusion. The problem 
involved physically moving the pieces 30 times, which is 
enough lifting experience with the pieces for the perceptuo-
motor system to attune to the equal weights of the objects. 
Thus, at the end of the problem-solving task (see “Methods” 
for details), all participants were assumed to have accurate 
implicit sensorimotor knowledge that the weights of the 
pieces were equal while still experiencing an illusory con-
scious experience that the smaller object is heavier than the 
larger object (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000). Then, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In 
the Control condition, participants performed a non-related 
task (i.e., solving a Sudoku puzzle). In the Gesture condi-
tion, participants were asked to explain the solution of the 
problem-solving task while gesturing. In the No-Gesture 
condition, participants were asked to sit on their hands while 
explaining the problem solution. It should be noted that, in 
gesture research, it is difficult to find a no-gesture explain-
ing condition without confounding variables. On one hand, 
research has shown that prohibiting gestures can negatively 
affect the semantic richness of explanations (e.g., Hostetter, 
Alibali, & Kita, 2007). On the other hand, it is difficult to 
find participants who do not gesture spontaneously (e.g., 
Eielts et al., 2018) when explaining tasks involving spatial 
and motor skills, and such participants may have different 
spatial and motor skills than participants who do use co-
speech gestures. In the present study, a prohibiting gesture 
condition was included to rule out an effect of explaining 
in and of it. Importantly, we did not expect semantic rich-
ness of verbal explanations to influence the SWI as the pre-
vious studies have shown no effects of gesture on speech 
content in this type of problem-solving task (e.g., Beilock 
& Goldin-Meadow, 2010). Similar exploratory analyses of 
speech content are included in the present paper to verify 
this (for results see Analysis 5 in “Appendix 2”). Finally, all 
participants provided two estimates of how heavy the task-
relevant pieces felt using a magnitude estimation procedure 
commonly used to ascertain the magnitude of the SWI (e.g., 
Buckingham, Goodale, White, & Westwood, 2016). They 
were first asked to recall heaviness from memory (i.e., main 
variable of interest) and subsequently provided an estimate 
while holding the objects (i.e., this more direct estimate of 
the SWI serves as a materials check). Participants who expe-
rience the SWI should report the small cube as being heav-
ier than the large cube in both measures. Furthermore, we 
predicted that the magnitude of the experienced SWI (i.e., 
recalled heaviness) might depend on whether participants 
had gestured about the task. Compared to participants who 
have not gestured about lifting the objects, participants who 
have gestured about lifting the objects should experience 
either a larger SWI (if gestures strengthen the consciously 
perceived illusion that the smaller object is heavier) or a 
smaller SWI (if gestures allow access to implicit sensorimo-
tor knowledge about actual lifting).
In addition to these pre-registered hypotheses (https ://
www.osf.io/9uh6q /), we conducted a series of exploratory 
analyses pertaining to how gestures are related to specific 
aspects of sensorimotor knowledge. In a recent conceptual 
replication of the original TOH studies, researchers failed 
to obtain the original sensorimotor strengthening effect 
(Wassenburg et  al., 2018). However, they did find that 
task-relevant gestures (i.e., movements from left-to-right) 
were related to relatively slower task performance in the 
switched condition (solving TOH from right to left), simi-
lar to the correlation between amount of one-handed move-
ments and task solution reported by Beilock and Goldin-
Meadow (2010) in the Switch condition. These results may 
be explained by the hypothesis that gestures reflect (rather 
than affect) the way that participants think about the task. In 
the present study, we addressed this hypothesis by examin-
ing how gesture form is related to the magnitude of either 
the recalled or the perceived illusion. We examined how 
often gestures were produced that closely mirrored the lift-
ing motion involved in the actual task (e.g., lifting with two 
hands, rather than one), to see if producing such congruent 
gestures would be associated with a larger or smaller illu-
sion. We also used a Frame Differencing Method (FDM; 
Brookshire, Lu, Nusbaum, Goldin-Meadow, & Cassasanto, 
2017; Romero et al., 2017; Pouw et al., 2018) to measure the 
velocity of two-handed lifting gestures to explore whether 
participants who report that the objects are heavier would 
move their hands more slowly as they gestured about lifting 
them. If gestures reflect such sensorimotor knowledge in 
their kinematics, this would provide strong evidence that 
gestures are based in sensorimotor know how.
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Method
Participants
This study was conducted in accordance with the guide-
lines of the ethical committee of the Department of Psy-
chology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. As stated in the 
pre-registration (https ://www.osf.io/9uh6q /), participants 
(N = 162, N − exclusions = 159) were recruited from a Dutch 
University for course credit or a small monetary reward. All 
participants provided informed consent prior to their inclu-
sion in the study. The sample was largely female (73.6%), 
right-handed (86.7%), and had a mean age of 20.78 years 
(SD = 2.79, range 18–38). Gender (χ2 = 2.06, p = .357) and 
hand dominance (χ2 = 5.82, p = .444) ratios were equal 
across conditions. The sample size was based on G*Power 
calculations for a between-subjects design with three groups: 
a medium-effect size (Cohen’s F = 0.25), a power of 80%, 
and an alpha of 5% (see Appendix C of the pre-registration 
for G*Power calculation specifications). Note that three par-
ticipants were excluded from the data set. One participant 
did not understand the instructions and technical problems 
resulted in the loss of video data from two other participants. 
As stated in the pre-registration, data collection was contin-
ued until there were 53 participants per condition.
Materials
Problem-solving task We used a physical version of the Frog 
Leap computer task (e.g., van Gog, 2011), which requires 
the transformation of a begin state into a goal state given 
specific rules. In our version of the task, participants moved 
pairs of cubes that each consisted of one large and one small 
cube (see Fig. 1). The goal is to move the pairs on the right 
side to the left, and the pairs on the left side to the right, by 
lifting both cubes in a pair simultaneously to “jump” them 
over another pair. A pair of cubes could only be placed on an 
empty designated spot (indicated by blue laminated ovals). 
Participants moved one pair at a time by lifting both cubes 
in the pair by their handles. Pairs could be moved only one 
step forward and backward moves were not permitted. A pair 
from one side was allowed to jump over one pair from the 
opposite side (and vice versa). Participants transformed the 
task from begin state to end state (see Fig. 2), and again from 
end state to begin state, which took 30 moves to complete.
Cubes Participants were presented with six identi-
cal pairs of cubes (see Figs. 1, 2). Each cube pair con-
sisted of a small (7 cm × 7 cm × 7 cm) and a large cube 
(10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm) that had been filled with fine-
grained sand to weigh exactly 450 g. This resulted in a den-
sity ratio between the small and large cubes of approximately 
3:1 (i.e., 1.31 g/cm3 for small cubes and 0.45 g/cm3 for large 
cubes). The previous research has shown that although equal 
in weight, a difference of 2.1 cm3 in size will result in a 
reliable size-weight illusion; a smaller cube of 7.4 cm3 was 
experienced to be about 20% heavier than the equally heavy 
but larger cube of 9.3 cm3 (i.e., with a density ratio of 2:1; 
Buckingham et al., 2016). All cubes were wrapped in sil-
ver–gray duct tape and marked with either two “x” or two 
“y” symbols to distinguish whether it began on the left side 
or right side. A handle was affixed to the top of each cube.
Fig. 1  Cube pairs (six identical sets). (Color figure online)
Fig. 2  Schematic representation of the task set-up of the adapted Frog Leap task. Upper picture shows begin state; lower picture shows the target 
state. (Color figure online)
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Camera All participants were tested in a lab with a built-
in video camera at the approximate eye height of a seated 
person. Participants were seated directly in front (i.e., 0° 
angle) of the camera at a distance of 280 cm. Care was taken 
to keep the seating position relative to the camera identical 
across participants to allow for exploratory analyses on the 
kinematics of gesture (e.g., Hilliard & Cook, 2017).
Heaviness ratings Heaviness of the small cube and the 
large cube was measured on a ten-point scale running from 
1 = ‘very light object’ to 10 = ‘very heavy object’ using the 
question “How heavy did you perceive the [small or large] 
cube to be?”. A visual representation of the heaviness scale 
was presented, and participants provided verbal responses. 
The difference between the two heaviness ratings for large 
and small cubes indicates the magnitude of the size-weight 
illusion (i.e., heaviness small cube > heaviness large cube). 
This is a common method to measure the size-weight illu-
sion when a single heaviness rating per cube is used (e.g., 
Buckingham et al., 2016). Note that the order of heaviness 
ratings for the small and large cubes was counterbalanced.
Design
The study followed a 2 × 2 × 3 mixed design with size (small 
cube vs. large cube) as a within-subjects factor, and order 
(small–large vs. large–small order of heaviness ratings) and 
condition (Gesture Condition vs. No-Gesture Condition vs. 
Control Condition) as between-subjects factors. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. 
Participants who were asked to explain the task were either 
encouraged to use their hands (Gesture Condition) or were 
prohibited from using their hands (No-Gesture Condition). 
Participants who did not explain the task solved a Sudoku 
puzzle instead (Control Condition). The main outcome vari-
able was Recalled Heaviness (from memory). An additional 
outcome variable, Perceived Heaviness, was added to check 
whether the materials were appropriate to induce a size-
weight illusion.1
Procedure
Participants were instructed that they would learn to solve 
a game puzzle. First, participants were given an instruction 
sheet containing the rules and goal of the game (“Appen-
dix 1” of the pre-registration). After indicating that they 
understood the rules, they completed a scripted problem-
solving routine of the task (“Appendix 2” of the pre-reg-
istration; practice phase), containing 15 steps to solve the 
puzzle once and 15 steps to solve the puzzle another time, 
but in the opposite direction (i.e., the end state was the begin 
state and vice versa). This way, the positions of cubes were 
perfectly counterbalanced within participants (i.e., all par-
ticipants lifted both small and large cubes with both left and 
right hands and moved them to the left vs. right an equal 
number of times). Solving the puzzle twice also ensured 
that all participants used 30 lifting trials as they practiced 
the puzzle. We required 30 lifting trials to achieve the state 
demonstrated in the previous research where participants no 
longer produce higher gripping forces for the smaller cube 
(i.e., the unconscious motor knowledge has attuned to actual 
weight of the cubes), but, nevertheless, still experience a 
conscious size-weight illusion (Flanagan & Beltzner, 2000).
Participants were instructed that there was no time con-
straint and that it was important that they worked as accu-
rately as possible. If the participant did make a mistake, the 
experimenter intervened by placing the misplaced pieces 
back and performing the right step instead. Only 12 par-
ticipants made one or two mistakes (control condition n = 4, 
gesture condition n = 3, and no-gesture condition n = 5). 
Importantly, the experimenter did not pick up the pieces, but 
moved the pieces by sliding the placeholders. This ensured 
that participants did not derive weight information from 
observing actions of the experimenter. The total time spent 
on the task was noted by the experimenter.
After the practice phase, the puzzle task was removed 
from the participant’s sight for the rest of the experiment. 
In the control condition, participants solved a Sudoku puz-
zle for 2 min. In the explanation conditions, the table was 
moved away to ensure that participants had a full motion 
range fully visible to the camera. Participants were asked 
to explain the 15 solution steps of the task, as though talk-
ing to someone who was familiar with the rules, but not the 
solution of the puzzle. To equate the amount of time spent 
explaining with the time spent in the control task, partici-
pants were instructed to stop explaining after 2 min, though 
this time requirement time was not mentioned to partici-
pants before their explanation. Half of the participants in 
the explanation conditions were instructed to use their hands 
while explaining the steps (gesture condition), whereas the 
other half were asked to put their hands under their legs to 
prevent them from using them (no-gesture condition). In line 
with the previous gesturing studies (e.g., Beilock & Goldin-
Meadow, 2010), we explicitly asked participants to (not) use 
their hands. In both conditions, if the participants were silent 
for 10 s or if they lost track of the imagined solution steps, 
they were instructed to try again and start with the first step. 
These prompts were repeated if necessary to ensure that the 
full 2 min were used for active explanation.
1 This additional measure was added after realizing the experiment 
should include a material check (with the same participants) to see 
if the materials would induce a size-weight illusion under normal 
conditions (i.e., perceived heaviness while lifting two cubes of differ-
ent sizes at the same time). At this point, 21 participants had already 
been tested and, therefore, we only have perceived heaviness ratings 
while holding the cubes from the remaining 138 participants.
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After 2 min of explaining or solving the Sudoku, par-
ticipants were given a visual representation of the ten-point 
heaviness rating scale and asked to provide a verbal rating 
of the recalled heaviness of the small and large cubes that 
they had lifted in the task (order was counterbalanced across 
participants). Participants were instructed that there were no 
wrong or right answers and to provide the first answer that 
came to mind. The majority of participants (N = 138) were 
then asked to lift the cube pair in the same way as they did 
during the task (i.e., using precision grip) and to report the 
perceived heaviness of each cube, while both were held. The 
reported ratings were recorded by the experimenter.
Coding
For both explanation conditions (i.e., gesture and no-gesture 
condition), speech was transcribed for subsequent analysis. 
In the no-gesture condition, video data were rechecked for 
gestures, and none were observed. All gestures in the gesture 
condition were coded in the context of concurrent speech, 
and three categories of gestures were counted (for examples, 
see Fig. 3): (1) deictic gestures (i.e., pointing to an object or 
location), (2) gestures representing grasp or move actions 
with one hand, and (3) gestures representing grasp or move 
actions with two hands. Note that, in the actual task, pairs 
of blocks were lifted simultaneously with one block in each 
hand. As such, gestures representing grasp or move actions 
with two hands most closely resemble the actions used in the 
problem task. All 53 videos were coded by one coder (one 
author of this paper) whose scores were used in analyses. 
Because coding was a time-intensive task, only a subset of 
the data (18%) was coded by a second coder (and author 
of this paper) to establish reliability. The reliability of the 
subset of participants may be generalized to the full sample 
(Hallgren, 2012) and this approach is in line with the pre-
vious studies using gesture coding (e.g., Chu et al., 2014; 
Cook & Goldin-Meadow, 2006). To quantify the agreement 
between the two coders, Krippendorff’s alpha (inter-rater 
reliability for two coders of a ratio variable) was calculated 
for the gesture count of each category separately (using the 
SPSS macro of Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). All alphas 
were above 0.96.
Exploratory: gesture kinematics using frame 
differencing method
We obtained the rate of movement (velocity) of gestures 
using a Frame Differencing Method (FDM; current sampling 
rate 25 frames per second). FDM utilizes an algorithm that 
computes the number of pixels that change from frame to 
frame from a video recording (using Python code made pub-
licly available by Brookshire et al., 2017). This method pro-
vides an indication of gross movement through time—and 
is reliable compared to the other methods such as Polhemus 
or Kinect (see Romero et al., 2017)—which can be used as 
an estimate of velocity of hand-gesture movements. We were 
interested in the velocity of lifting gestures, specifically, to 
see if the kinematics of such gestures during the lifting phase 
is related to participants’ estimated heaviness of the cubes. 
We (1) computed velocity traces for each participant’s video 
data using the FDM method, (2) z-normalized the velocity 
traces for each participant, such that individual differences 
in body size (and thus pixel change/velocity) are rescaled, 
and (3) applied a Butterworth low-pass filter (10 Hz) which 
smooths noise-related fluctuations (for data manipulation 
procedures, see R script on OSF: https ://www.osf.io/9uh6q 
/).
Subsequently, an independent rater who was unaware 
of the weight judgments given by the participants used the 
annotation software ELAN (Lausberg & Sloetjes, 2009) to 
identify each two-handed grasping gesture that simulated a 
lifting movement of the objects. Two-handed gestures that 
did not include a lifting movement were not used for this 
analysis.2 Using custom-made script in R, we merged the 
ELAN gesture codings with the velocity trace data. We then 
used this to identify the velocity trace of the first 500 ms of 
each lifting gesture that was produced by each participant. 
We focused on this time frame, because physics dictates that, 
everything else being equal, heavy objects will have more 
inertia (are more resistant to change in motion) as compared 
Fig. 3  Example of deictic, one-handed, and two-handed grasp/move gestures
2 Although these two-handed gestures were coded under different 
criteria as to isolate lifting movements, this measure significantly cor-
related (r = .73) with two-handed grasp/move gestures.
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to lighter objects. Thus, if a gesture simulates the inertial 
forces of lifting a heavy object, the velocities generated 
during the first 500 ms of the lifting gesture will be lower 
(i.e., “the movement will be slower”) as compared to ges-
tures simulating manipulations with lighter objects with low 
inertia. Indeed, velocity or positive peaks in velocity have 
been used to quantify language-induced weight-expectancy 
effects for actual lifting movements (e.g., Scorolli, Borghi, & 
Glenberg, 2009). Furthermore, (average) velocity for lifting 
phases (rather than the reach and placing phases), is one of 
the defining perceptual cues that determine whether observ-
ers can see whether a light vs. heavy object is being lifted 
(Alaerts, Breukelaar, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2012). Thus, 
we focused on velocity for the initial lifting phase (500 ms) 
of the lifting gesture.
We also computed the combined heaviness rating of the 
objects for each participant, which is the average of the 
recalled heaviness rating for the small and large objects. 
Because we are interested in how weight judgments affect 
gesture kinematics, we computed the average gesture veloc-
ity trajectory for all participants who reported a particular 
heaviness rating. Thus, if six participants judged objects to 
have a combined weight of 3, the average velocity trajectory 
(500 ms trajectories) was calculated for the gestures of those 
participants. Thus, for each observed heaviness rating, we 
have a stereotypical (i.e., averaged) gesture velocity trajec-
tory. This way, we can compare how gesture velocity trajec-
tories differ as a function of whether they were produced by 
someone with lower or higher weight judgments.
Results
The method and results of this study were pre-registered. 
We, first, present the results pertaining to hypotheses and 
analyses that were pre-registered. As described, these con-
firmatory analyses did not support the predictions stated 
in the pre-registration. We, thus, conducted several further 
analyses to help contextualize and understand these null 
findings. Such analyses are labeled as exploratory in the 
sections that follow.
Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 in “Appendix 1”, the means, standard deviations, 
and correlations are provided for the main variables in this 
study.
Planned confirmatory analysis: effect of condition 
on recalled heaviness ratings
As stated in the pre-registration, we performed a 2 × 3 mixed 
ANOVA (including interactions), with Size (small vs. large 
cube) as a within-subjects factor, and Condition (gesture, 
no-gesture, control) as a between-subjects factor. Note that 
counterbalanced conditions for the order of heaviness ratings 
(small–large or large–small) did not affect overall heaviness 
ratings, F(1, 157) = 0.07, p = 0.799, or differences in heavi-
ness ratings, F(1, 157) = 0.036, p = 0.849, and will, there-
fore, not be adopted in the tested models (as planned in the 
pre-registration). Surprisingly, in contrast to the typically 
reported size-weight illusion (SWI), participants recalled the 
large cube as being heavier (M = 4.71, SD = 1.83) than the 
small cube (M = 3.88, SD = 1.82), Size: F(1, 156) = 23.63, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13, d = − 0.39. This indicates that there 
was an inverted SWI when participants reported the cubes’ 
heaviness from memory. As can be seen in Fig. 4, there was 
no statistically significant effect of Condition on recalled 
heaviness, Condition: F(2, 156) = 0.47, p = .627, ηp2 = 0.006. 
Finally, the difference in heaviness ratings for small vs. large 
cubes did not differ as a function of Condition, Size × Con-
dition: F(2, 156) = 0.11, p = .892, ηp2 = 0.001. This indi-
cates that the SWI was unaffected by whether participants 
explained or gestured about the task.
Exploratory analysis 1: evidential value for null 
findings
Given the null results for our confirmatory analyses with 
regards to condition, we performed an additional explora-
tory Bayesian analysis to estimate the likelihood of the 
observed data given the null hypothesis. All Bayes’ factors 
(BF) reported in this manuscript were computed by JASP 
(JASP Team 2016, Version 0.8.4), which operates with the 
default priors p(M) = 0.5 (Cauchy prior of h = 0.75; Rouder, 
Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, & Wagenmakers, 2017). Jef-
freys (1961) classifies the strength of effects with respect to 
Fig. 4  Effect of condition on recalled heaviness. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals
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Bayes’ factors (BF)3 as follows: no evidence BF = 1, anec-
dotal evidence BF = 1–3, substantial evidence BF = 3–10, 
strong BF = 10–30, very strong BF = 30–100, and decisive 
BF > 100.
We performed a Bayesian 2 × 3 mixed-design ANOVA 
(including interactions), with Size (small vs. large cube) as 
within-subjects factor and Condition as between-subjects 
factor. The Bayesian analysis for the between-subject effect 
of Condition yielded  BF01 = 12.13 (strong evidence). This 
suggests that the null hypothesis, predicting no differences in 
heaviness ratings as a function of Condition, is 12.13 times 
more likely given the data as compared to a model predicting 
differences between groups. The interaction effect of Condi-
tion and Size yielded decisive evidence for the null hypoth-
esis  (BF01 = 191.09). Note that Bayesian analyses also pro-
vided decisive evidence against the null hypothesis for the 
within-subjects effect of Size, where we obtained an inverted 
SWI  (BF10 > 1000). In summary, we obtained strong to deci-
sive evidence that Condition did not affect heaviness ratings 
of the small cube vs. large cube when made from memory.
Exploratory analyses of perceived heaviness ratings
Analysis 2a: materials check We did not obtain the typical 
SWI when participants recalled heaviness of the cubes from 
memory. In fact, participants rated the large cube as heavier 
than the small cube when rating heaviness from memory 
of their previous experience (an inverted SWI). However, 
when heaviness was rated while actually holding the objects 
at the end of the experiment (i.e., as a direct estimate of 
the SWI), the typical SWI appeared as expected, indicating 
that the cubes did, indeed, generate a reliable SWI in this 
sample. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the small cube (M = 5.32, 
SD = 1.61) was perceived as heavier than the large cube 
(M = 3.72, SD = 1.37), Size: F(1, 138) = 153.70, p < .001, 
 BF10 > 1000, d = 1.05.
Analysis 2b: effects of condition We further assessed 
whether Condition affected perceived heaviness, while 
the cubes were being held. We performed a similar 2 × 3 
mixed-design ANOVA (including interactions), with Size 
(small vs. large cube) as a within-subjects factor and Condi-
tion as a between-subjects factor. There was no statistically 
significant effect of Condition, F(2, 156) = 0.07, p = .934, 
 BF01 = 10.06, ηp2 = 0.001, or Condition × Size interaction, 
F(2, 136) = 0.63, p = .535,  BF01 = 58.92, ηp2 = 0.009, on 
perceived heaviness ratings.
Exploratory analyses of possible covariates
Analysis 3: individual differences in gesture The previous 
research has shown that the number of task-relevant gestures 
mediated magnitude of the effects on problem-solving per-
formance (Beilock & Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Wassenburg 
et al., 2018). Table 1 (“Appendix 1”) provides a correla-
tion matrix of the number of observed gesture types that 
occurred per minute (deictic, one-handed grasp/move, and 
two-handed grasp/move) and heaviness ratings of the cubes. 
In addition, for the gesture condition, the mean gesture 
rate per minute is provided in this table. The most strik-
ing result in this correlational analysis was that more two-
handed grasp/move gestures were highly correlated with a 
smaller difference in recalled heaviness of the two cubes, 
β = − 0.37, t(52) = − 2.82, p = .007,  BF10 = 6.54. As can be 
seen in Fig. 6, the difference was primarily carried by judg-
ments that the larger cube was heavier, r = .29, t(52) = 2.18, 
p = .034,  BF10 = 2.11, while the numerical judgments for 
the recalled heaviness of the smaller cube were unrelated 
to the number of two-handed gestures per minute; r = − .15, 
t(52) = − 1.08, p = .284,  BF10 = 1.90. Note from Table 1 that 
there were no significant correlations between other types of 
gestures (deictic and one-handed grasp/move gestures) and 
difference in heaviness recalled from memory. The signifi-
cant negative correlation, r = − .28, t(52) = − 2.11, p = .040, 
 BF10 = 1.67, between the total number of gestures (sum of 
deictic, one-handed and two-handed grasp/move gestures, 
and all other undefined gestures) and difference in heavi-
ness recalled from memory thus seems to be carried by the 
number of two-handed grasp/move gestures. Also note that 
there were no significant correlations of gesture with respect 
to perceived heaviness, while the objects were in hand.
Fig. 5  Effect of condition on perceived heaviness. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals
3 Note that BFs are always reported for the hypothesis that is most 
likely given the data. Therefore,  BF10 (odds ratio for the alternative 
vs. null hypotheses given the data) provides evidence for the alter-
native hypothesis (supporting significant p values), whereas  BF01 
(odds ratio null/alternative) provides evidence for the null hypothesis 
(supporting non-significant p values). Thus, larger BFs always equal 
stronger evidence.
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Analyses 4 and 5: other individual differences In Analyses 
4 and 5, we explored individual differences in practice time, 
explanation time, and speech content, to determine whether 
these variables may have affected our results. Results showed 
that neither practice time nor explanation time was statisti-
cally significant when added as covariates to the confirma-
tory analyses. Furthermore, speech rate and speech content 
could not account for the effect of two-handed gestures on 
Fig. 6  Two-handed gestures and heaviness of the objects, as rated 
from memory. Regression slopes and confidence intervals for the 
relation between two-handed grasp/move gestures and recalled heavi-
ness ratings for the (differences of) small cube (upper right) and large 
cube (lower right). Lower values on the difference scores (left graph) 
indicate that the larger cube is rated from memory as heavier than the 
smaller cube, leading to negative scores. Note that some participants 
(those with positive difference scores) did recall the smaller cube as 
heavier than the larger cube, indicating memory of the consciously 
experienced illusion. Figures were generated with statistical software 
R (R Core Team, 2017). (Color figure online)
Fig. 7  Velocity traces for the two-handed gesture launches and scat-
ter plot for velocity samples as related to heaviness ratings. Left 
panel: mean velocity traces (500 ms) for each recalled heaviness rat-
ing (blackened lines indicated higher weight estimates; more yellow/
lighter lines indicate lighter recalled heaviness ratings). A steeper 
positive slope of the velocity trajectory indicates that a gesture is 
moving more quickly; that is, velocity of the movement is increased 
in a shorter amount of time (i.e., higher acceleration) as compared 
to a more negatively sloped trajectory. Right panel: scatter plot with 
regression slope and SE interval (heaviness represented in color to 
match left panel) and x-axis. (Color figure online)
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recalled heaviness. For a more detailed description of the 
results, see “Appendix 2”.
Analysis 6: exploratory analyses of gesture kinematics 
Figure 7 shows the velocity traces for gesture launch phases 
(500 ms) averaged for participants and combined heaviness 
rating from memory (min = 2, M = 4.24, max = 7). Participants 
who rated objects as heavier (darker black lines) produced ges-
ture launches with lower velocity and acceleration than par-
ticipants who rated objects as lighter (lines with more yellow 
coloring), as indicated by less steep trajectories and earlier 
velocity stabilization. This suggests that participants who 
recalled objects as heavier gestured about the objects as though 
they would be more difficult to lift. A correlation analyses 
confirmed that the higher the recalled heaviness of the small 
cube and large cube (combined), the lower the velocity values, 
r(154) = − 0.29 (~ medium-effect size), p < .001,  BF10 = 78.45 
(see Fig. 7 right panel for the relation of heaviness and velocity 
data). Note that this relationship between velocity and weight 
estimates was not present for weight estimates that were made 
when objects were held, r(154) = 0.04, p = .52,  BF01 = 6.41.
Discussion
The present pre-registered study assessed how gestures sup-
port memory for sensorimotor information of the weight of 
task-relevant objects during problem solving. The pieces 
were designed to induce the visual-haptic size-weight illusion 
(SWI), which is a consciously experienced perception that 
smaller objects are heavier than larger objects when the two 
are actually the same weight. Because gestures have been sug-
gested to affect sensorimotor knowledge (Beilock & Goldin-
Meadow, 2010; Cooperrider et al., 2015; Goldin-Meadow & 
Beilock, 2010; Trofatter et al., 2015), it was predicted that the 
magnitude of the SWI would be affected when participants 
gestured about the task-relevant objects. On one hand, gestures 
could increase the size of the illusion, suggesting that gestures 
strengthen, in memory, the consciously perceived illusion 
that the pieces differ in weight. On the other hand, gestures 
could decrease the size of the illusion, suggesting that gestures 
strengthen the implicit sensorimotor knowledge that the pieces 
have the same weight. We found no evidence to support the 
prediction that gesturing about the problem pieces affected the 
weight estimates of the pieces in either direction. Instead, our 
results show that judgments about the weight of the cubes were 
unaffected by whether participants gestured.
Interestingly, our exploratory analyses revealed that speak-
ers who produced the most gestures mimicking the form of the 
two-handed lifting and moving actions involved in the task were 
also the most likely to experience a large inverted SWI in their 
memory for the pieces. Namely, the number of two-handed 
grasp gestures produced per minute by participants who were 
told to gesture as they explained the task was reliably associated 
with their memory of how heavy the pieces were. This finding, 
thus, replicates the previous reports that action-relevant ges-
tures are reflective of sensorimotor cognition (e.g., Beilock & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2010; Wassenburg et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
we provide an additional evidence that the velocity with which 
speakers lifted their hands as they gestured is related to their 
memory of the objects’ weight. When speakers thought of the 
objects as heavy in their memory, they gestured about them as 
though they would be more difficult to lift, as indicated by lower 
average velocity traces. This provides evidence that speakers 
embody weight information in the kinematics of their co-speech 
gestures (as predicted by Mangelsdorf, Cooperrider, & Goldin-
Meadow, 2017; see also Ansuini et al., 2016 for related findings 
with pantomimes; see also Cook & Tanenhaus, 2009, for how 
gesture kinematics is affected by the previous task experiences). 
Future research could specifically focus on how the kinemat-
ics of gestures about interactions with objects might be simi-
lar to and different from the kinematics of actually interacting 
with the objects. Indeed, although gestures might approximate 
object-oriented actions in some respects (as shown here), they 
are very likely to diverge on the other aspects wherein kinemat-
ics are constrained by dynamics that arise by actual wielding of 
objects (e.g., Runeson & Frykholm, 1983).
Furthermore, this is the first evidence that gestures reflect 
sensorimotor information that is consciously perceived, rather 
than the precise kinematics of a previous action. Participants 
who believed the objects were heavier gestured about them 
with slower lifting velocities than participants who believed 
that they were lighter, even though all objects in the present 
study were of exactly the same weight and required identi-
cal lifting velocities as participants solved the task. This is 
interesting, because it suggests that gestures are not direct rec-
reations of the previous actions; rather, they are actions that 
are filtered through the participants’ conscious beliefs about 
those actions. This finding aligns with claims that gestures are 
representational (Novack & Goldin-Meadow, 2017) or simu-
lated (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008) actions. Thus, actions and 
gestures are critically different, because gestures cannot and 
do not attune to action-relevant information in the environment 
the way that actual actions on objects do (Laimgruber, Golden-
berg, & Hermsdörfer, 2005; Kuntz, Karl, Doan, & Whishaw, 
2018; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983), at least not when the 
objects are not present (cf. Chu & Kita, 2016). Although ges-
tures may have their origin in the action system, their execution 
is affected by the producer’s sensorimotor expectations about 
how they would act in the world, rather than by an implicit 
memory of how that action was actually produced.
In the current task, it is possible that participants were not 
judging the weight of the objects on the basis of attuning to 
the previous experience via memory at all. It might be that 
no such memory about weight was available, or, otherwise, 
explicable. Instead, a rational choice was made on the fly based 
on a heuristic that larger/smaller objects are heavier/lighter. 
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It is unclear, however, why the use of such a strategy would 
be related to how speakers gesture about lifting the pieces. 
Instead, we argue that participants were most likely accessing 
a haptic knowledge for a simulation for what it felt like to lift 
the pieces when they made their weight judgments. Indeed, it 
has been found that, when judging an object’s weight, people 
actually imagine holding the object rather than using some 
kind of propositional rule (Klatzky, Lederman, & Matula, 
1991). Furthermore, it has been found that previously expe-
rienced haptic information can be attuned to with some suc-
cess, as haptic memory of objects even allows one to discover 
new properties of the object in imagery (Pouw, Aslanidou, 
Kamermans, & Paas, 2017; see also Kamermans et al., under 
review). Thus, although there is a possibility that participants 
only remembered visual properties of the objects and then used 
these visual properties to make heuristic inferences about the 
objects’ haptic properties, research suggests that this is not how 
people tend to judge haptic properties from memory.
We speculate that both gestures and weight estimates in 
the current context result from simulations that are neither the 
result of a “pure memory” of a previous action, nor the result 
of a rule-like “heuristic” that “small/large objects are lighter/
heavier”. Rather, a simulation involves generation of informa-
tion that abides by regularities observed in the real-world, and 
is not the simple replay of a previously performed action. This 
is based on the argument that actions are not represented by 
some motor plan that incorporates a list of muscle activations 
needed to perform the action successfully (Bernstein, 1966). 
Indeed, research (e.g., Kelso, Tuller, Vatikiotis-Bateson, & 
Fowler, 1984) has shown that when an action is initiated (e.g., 
speaking), perturbation of the trajectory of that action (e.g., 
locking the jaw in place) leads to fluid adjustments which 
recruit the other muscles than would, otherwise, be the case 
(e.g., lip adjustments), yielding a new sensorimotor solution 
to the same goal (e.g., speaking a syllable “|baeb|”). Thus, if 
gesture is derived from practical action, it is likely based on the 
broader ability to construct sensorimotor solutions constrained 
by contextual demands, rather than on memory of sensorimo-
tor particulars. Of course, gestures are far less constrained by 
contextual demands than actions, because they do not involve 
real objects. This is precisely why gestures may reflect stereo-
typical sensorimotor solutions—gestures act out actions in ways 
that would fit most contexts (e.g., slower lifting gestures for 
heavier objects). A simulation is, therefore, a constructive pro-
cess based on the accumulated sensorimotor knowledge that 
“smaller/larger objects are lighter/heavier”, but it goes beyond 
a simple heuristic, because it involves knowledge of real-world 
sensorimotor contingencies. We suggest that both producing 
gestures about interacting with the pieces and imagining the 
pieces so as to judge their weight rely on the simulation of 
expectations about how it would feel to interact with the pieces.
Importantly, however, in our study, we find no evidence 
that gesturing about the pieces in a certain way caused a 
change in how participants thought about the weight of the 
pieces. Experimentally manipulating gesture did not affect 
participants’ recollection or perception of the weights of the 
cubes. The fact that no significant differences between condi-
tions were found and speech content did not affect perceived 
heaviness indicates that it is unlikely that our choice of con-
ditions impacted our results. Instead, we observed an effect 
within the gesture condition—a correlation between how 
participants thought about the cubes and how they gestured 
about them. Participants’ utilization of two-handed gestures 
was related to the magnitude of the SWI they experienced, 
and the velocity with which they gestured was related to their 
recalled heaviness of the cubes. We speculate that, in both 
cases, how people thought about the task as they described 
it was reflected in gesture. Participants may have imagined 
the motor kinematics of the task to a greater or lesser degree 
as they were explaining the problem. Those more inclined 
to simulate the specifics of interacting with the cubes were 
more likely to produce two-handed gestures that showed the 
specific action required to manipulate the cubes, including 
the relative velocity of lifting light/heavy objects. Further-
more, participants who thought more specifically about the 
motor processes involved in the task as they were describing 
were also likely to form a weight judgment that was based on 
a sensorimotor judgment when asked to judge the objects’ 
weight. Such detailed sensorimotor imagination of the cubes 
(both during the description task and during the rating task) 
was particularly likely to be distorted by the sensorimotor 
know-how that large objects are generally heavy. Under this 
explanation, two-handed lifting gestures were an embodi-
ment of detailed sensorimotor imagery about lifting, but 
were not a driving agent in whether participants adopted a 
detailed sensorimotor imagining or not.
An interesting aspect of this finding is how the judgments 
were biased when they were made from memory. In the classic 
SWI, participants judge a smaller cube that they are holding as 
heavier than a larger cube when the two are actually the same 
weight. Although we replicated this traditional SWI when the 
cubes were compared from immediate experience (the smaller 
cube was perceived as 43% heavier than the larger cube), when 
participants were asked to judge the heaviness of the cubes from 
memory, they seemed to judge heaviness rationally—that is, 
they reported that the larger cube had felt 21% heavier than the 
smaller cube.4 This effect was not predicted, and to our knowl-
edge, this is the first study that has revealed an inverted SWI 
when weight judgments are made from memory (as the SWI 
is generally not studied in relation to the memory system). The 
previous research has indicated that people actually imagine 
4 Note, however, that the inversion is not complete as it seems to be 
half the size of the original size-weight illusion, 21% versus 43% dif-
ference. Also, some participants did perceive the smaller object as 
heavier based on memory reducing the inverted size-weight illusion 
on the group level.
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holding an object when judging the object’s weight and other 
haptic properties (Klatzky et al., 1991), yet the observed inver-
sion of the SWI in memory suggests that this active imagining 
is not operating with accurate implicit memories of how these 
particular objects were perceived as they were manipulated 
(which would have led to no illusion) or with accurate explicit 
memories of how these particular objects were perceived as 
they were manipulated (which would have led to the traditional 
smaller-is-heavier illusion). Instead, the judgment seems to be 
based on a stereotypical understanding that larger objects are 
typically heavier than smaller objects.
One of the reviewers of the current paper suggested that there 
is a possibility that the memory of sensorimotor experiences 
may be affected by sensorimotor expectations. Under this view, 
it is not so much that participants are drawing from a memory of 
a sensorimotor experience (e.g., small object being heavy), but 
rather from a transformed memory where unexpected aspects 
of the sensorimotor event (e.g., light objects feeling heavier) 
are “washed out”. The degree to which a memory is resolved in 
favor of a sensorimotor expectancy might then explain why ges-
ture is related to heaviness ratings from memory. The task-rele-
vant two-handed gesturing effectively is related to expectancy, 
not so much a memory. We are very favourable to this idea as we 
have argued that gestures are governed by a system that operates 
on a history of sensorimotor contingencies, rather than on the 
sensorimotor specifics of a moment ago, though the scope of 
the current results deems this idea still too speculative, and more 
research is needed to directly test this idea. Note that research on 
the SWI has confirmed that repeated interactions with objects 
can affect the illusion, suggesting that the sensorimotor history 
can be manipulated and is not some unchangeable pre-given. 
Namely, Flanagan, Bittner, and Johansson (2008) have found 
that after a multi-day training with interacting with objects that 
induce the SWI (240 lifts for 11 days), the SWI not only dis-
sipates, it is inverted. Extensively trained participants judged 
larger objects as heavier than smaller objects that weighed the 
same. If gestures are indeed based on expectations that operate 
on slow timescales, we would expect that multi-day training with 
new sensorimotor contingencies would be (especially) appar-
ent in the way that people gesture about such contingencies. 
Further research can explore our hypothesis that gestures attune 
to a history of sensorimotor interactions by assessing effects of 
multi-day training vs. immediate previous experiences when we 
gesture about object manipulations. Furthermore, perhaps, in 
the current paradigm, repeated sensorimotor imagining of the 
objects in gesture may come to affect sensorimotor expectations 
given enough time (Pouw & Hostetter, 2016).
To conclude, the present pre-registered study has offered 
novel insights into how gestures are related to memory of 
sensorimotor information. Although gesturing about the 
cubes did not affect participants’ memories of how heavy the 
objects were or their judgments of perceived heaviness when 
the objects were held again, the kinematics of gestures were 
related to speakers’ thinking about sensorimotor properties of 
the cubes. The results indicate that gestures reflect rather than 
affect the way that we think about and remember objects’ sen-
sorimotor properties, at least in the context examined here. It 
appears that gestures do not just reveal information about the 
actions which a speaker performed; instead, they reveal how 
the speaker thinks about what they did.
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Appendix 2
Analysis 4: individual differences in practice time We 
assessed whether differences in time spent practicing the 
task differed per condition. An ANOVA revealed that 
this was not the case (F < 1, BF’s01 = 6.82). Furthermore, 
there were small differences in the amount of time allot-
ted (SD = 7.77 s) to explain the task, as one experimenter 
stopped the stopwatch when participants started to explain 
the rules of the task instead of the procedure of the task. 
This did not lead to significant differences in explanation 
time between the no-gesture vs. gesture condition, (F < 1, 
BF’s01 = 6.32). Neither practice time nor explanation time 
was statistically significant when added as covariates to 
the previous confirmatory analyses for the effect of Condi-
tion on heaviness ratings (Fs < 1, BF’s01 > 3.46).
Analysis 5: individual differences in speech and its rela-
tion with gesture Although none of the participants in the 
explanation conditions (no-gesture and gesture condition) 
mentioned weight or heaviness during their explanations, 
nine participants mentioned size at least once. Of these, 
four were in the no-gesture condition, and five were in 
the gesture condition (mean number of mentions of size: 
no-gesture condition = 0.17, SD = 0.67, gesture condi-
tion = 0.45, SD = 1.61, t[104] = 1.18 p = .241,  BF01 = 2.62, 
d = 0.23). In general, participants in the no-gesture condi-
tion spoke 97.00 (SD = 26.19) words per minute, as com-
pared to 110.39 (SD = 22.90) words per minute for partici-
pants in the gesture condition. This difference in speech 
rate was statistically significant, t(104) = 2.80, p = .006, 
 BF10 = 6.370, d = 0.54.
We further assessed relations between spoken words 
per minute, the number of mentions of weights and size, 
and gesture frequencies per minute (see also Table 1 in 
“Appendix 1”). First, there was a statistically significant 
positive correlation between number of words spoken and 
the total number of gestures (p < .001,  BF10 = 120.135) 
and deictic gestures (p = .002,  BF10 = 16.35). However, 
the number of words spoken did not significantly corre-
late with two-handed gestures (p = .176,  BF01 = 5.69) or 
one-handed gestures (p = .264,  BF01 = 1.45). No significant 
correlations were found for the number of mentions of size 
of the cubes and gesture frequencies.
Although the number of words spoken did not seem 
related to two-handed gestures, it did relate in a similar 
way to the inverted SWI. Namely, just as two-handed ges-
tures were related to a larger inverted SWI from memory, 
higher speech rates also related to a larger inverted SWI, 
β = − 0.21, t(105) = − 2.21, p = .029,  BF10 = 1.787. How-
ever, when both number of words and number of two-
handed gestures per minute were entered in a single analy-
sis (with participants from the gesture condition), only 
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number of two-handed gestures was a significant predic-
tor of the size of the illusion, R2 = 0.15, F(2, 25) = 4.33, 
p = .018; βwords = − 0.11, t(52) = − 0.86, p = .396; 
βtwo-handed gestures = − 0.37, t(52) = − 2.84, p = .006. The pre-
dictive value of a model with only two-handed gestures 
as predictor  (BF10 = 6.544) was better than a model with 
only speech  (BF10 = 0.341) or with speech and two-handed 
gesture  (BF10 = 2.840). Taken together, these results sug-
gest that speech rate cannot account for the effect of two-
handed gestures on recalled heaviness.
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